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Abstract
In this paper, commuting is introduced to a federal setting where an ad valorem
residence based tax on labour income is decentralised. Under full decentralisation,
this has lower-level (state) governments set inefficiently low taxes, even when house-
holds as a whole do not migrate. The motive of state governments is not to attract
more workers, but to boost labour supply of own residents and hamper labour sup-
plied by non-residents. When the labour tax base is co-occupied by the federal
and state governments furthermore, either public under- or overtaxation may occur.
Our model identifies clear conditions for states to overprovide, i.e. for the overall
fiscal externality to be negative. Moreover, such a negative externality may arise
even when the vertical as well as horizontal externalities are positive in isolation,
and one would rather expect underprovision. Lastly, when states differ in terms of
preferences and technology, an inflow of commuters makes it more likely for states
to set taxes inefficiently low.
∗With special thanks to André Decoster and Stef Proost (CES - KU Leuven) for their valuable com-
ments and suggestions.
†Center for Economic Studies (CES), KU Leuven.
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1 Introduction
When more than one (level of) government has taxing authority in a federation, taxes will
be imposed on the same, or at least interdependent tax bases. Tax policies of one lower-
level government 1 thus have an impact on tax revenues raised by other governments, as
well as on the welfare of residents living in other states. Now, when state governments dis-
regard these effects of own taxation on other states, tax externalities will distort regional
fiscal decision making leading to under- or overprovision of public services.
In the case of tax base mobility between states, positive horizontal externalities drive
the outcome where regional taxation as well as public provision is set inefficiently low
2. Tax competition leading to a 'race to the bottom' scenario is often given as the
textbook example here, although other forms of tax exporting exist. When tax bases are
co-occupied by federal and state governments moreover, vertical externalities enter the
fray. Here the externality works through the effect on the shared tax base, which may
contract due to increased state taxation so that federal tax revenues decrease as well. This
negative effect is not taken into account by state governments, resulting in inefficiently
high regional tax rates compared to the unitary country second-best optimum 3. Also,
when taxation is ad valorem these vertical externalities may have a positive sign, as was
shown by Dahlby (2003). Which kind of externality gains the upper hand when both
horizontal and vertical externalities are at work lastly, was looked into by Keen and
Kotsogiannis for capital taxation in a theoretical framework (2002), and empirically by
Brulhart and Janetti (2006).
In this paper we set up a theoretical model sizing up vertical as well as horizontal
externalities, with labour income as the tax base through which the externalities will work.
Given the recent reforms agreed on by the Belgian federal government, decentralising 25%
of the personal income tax, and not in the least because of the often unique characteristics
of the Belgian federation, the model is tailored as much as possible to the Belgian setting.
Being a small federation of only three states, marked by significant inter-state disparities
in preferences and productivity, and enjoying a very high degree of inter-state commuting
4 Belgium indeed makes for an interesting case. Also, zooming in on these characteristics
brings out a blind spot in the existing literature, where the impact of commuting is usually
downplayed.
Most models dealing with labour income as a source of externalities, are based on
wage formation following from non-integrated regional labour markets. In other words,
the standard assumption is that people only supply labour in their state of residence5.
The only way to introduce externalities in such a setting consequently, is to allow entire
households to migrate across states. But when households are perfectly mobile in this
sense, horizontal externalities cancel out altogether because of 'incentive equivalence' as
pointed out by Myers (1990, 6). In this case state governments will in fact maximise
the welfare of households living in the federation as a whole, since they take household
1Throughout the paper, lower-level jurisdictions will be referred to as 'states'.
2See e.g. Wilson (1986), Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986). For interesting empirical work on horizontal
externalities, see Brueckner (2003).
3See e.g. Boadway and Keen (1996), Boadway et al. (1998), Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002, 2004).
Hayashi and Boadway (2001) or Andersson et al. (2004) deliver insightful empirical work.
4E.g., 400.000 high earning workers commute daily from Wallonia and Flanders to the Brussels region
(out of a total labour force of only 4.5 million)
5A notable exception can be found in the last section of Boadway (1996), yet also here clearing regional
labour markets drive wage formation which delivers different results compared to ours.
6See also Boadway (1996, 2004) or Wellisch (2000). For an interesting theoretical analysis of the
inefficiencies occurring in a setting of imperfect household mobility, see Sato (2000).
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migration into account. As a result, the Samuelson condition will always be met as long as
the labour tax base is not co-occupied by the federal government (Boadway, 1996). The
only welfare losses then follow from an inefficient household allocation across regions,
which lies beyond our interest here since labour market-induced migration in Belgium is
almost nonexistent.
For a federation with Belgian features, where at least 10% of the workforce commutes
between states, the assumption of non-integrated regional labour markets becomes dif-
ficult to maintain. In our model we therefore make use of a common labour market,
where wages are endogenously determined as commuting flows equilibrate wages across
all states 7. Policy changes in one state will consequently be felt throughout the entire
federal system, even when household migration does not occur. We thus model a situa-
tion where horizontal externalities are re-introduced to the analysis through commuting
effects. Further tailoring our model to the Belgian case, labour taxes will be residence
based, so that workers commute until they receive the same gross wage in every state.
Following Dahlby (2003) and Kotsogiannis and Martinez (2008) we employ an ad-valorem
tax, enriching the model when it comes to vertical externalities. An inter-state commut-
ing cost lastly, would not be vital to our Belgian focus here. Commuting from one Belgian
state to another will often be as costly as commuting from one city to another within the
same state.
The paper proceeds as follows. Following the detail of the model in section 2, section
3 considers the benchmark case of a unitary country where only the federal government
raises taxes. Since no externalities can occur in such a setting, the second-best optimum
is attained. Section 4 subsequently, sees fiscal decision making (partially) decentralised
so that the externalities come to the fore. In a fully decentralised case only the state
governments will levy taxes and decide on public provision. In a shared tax base case
secondly, the federal government as well as state governments tax the same labour income
tax base to finance their respective part of public provision. Lastly, section 5 redoes the
first exercise but introduces regional heterogeneity to the analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 The structure of the model
The federation consists of a limited number (n) of states, where the population of rep-
resentative households per state is normalised to 1. Both state and federal governments
are benevolent, maximising the welfare of citizens living within their respectiveborders.
Preferences of the representative household living in state i are defined by utility of
the form Ui(ci, Li, Gi, G
F
i ) = ci + li(Li) + gi(Gi) + g
F
i (G
F
i ), with ci consumption of a
composite (numeraire) private good and Li labour supplied by this household. Gi will
be the publicly provided private good in state i provided by state i itself, whilst GFi
marks the publicly provided private good provided by the federal government in state
i 8. Sub-utility li(Li) is concave and decreasing in Li, whilst gi(Gi) and g
F
i (G
F
i ) are
concave and increasing in Gi and G
F
i respectively. The assumption of separability in the
utility function implies public provision does not affect the leisure-consumption decisions
of households, and also omits income effects.
7A similar approach was followed by Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002), where unit taxes on capital drive
the externalities and capital is fully mobile across regions.
8National public goods could be introduced, but this would complicate the analysis with little ad-
ditional insight to the effects of decentralisation examined in what follows. Our focus lies with the
inefficiency of state policies, and national public goods have no particular role to play in that regard
(Boadway et al., 1998). Also, since we work with a representative consumer here, public provision can
also be seen as a state public good.
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Public provision is financed by an ad valorem residence based tax on labour, denoted
by τi for the states and τ0 for the federal government (τi+τ0 = τ). Profit taxes θ(i), when
included, are exogenously fixed and profits are taxed away entirely by the government(s).
State aggregate output xi is produced by applying labour to a fixed factor such as
land, xi = Fi(LDi), with the usual properties of F
′ > 0 > F ′′ 9. Firms are immobile and
maximise profits, given by pii = Fi(LDi) − wiLDi , and choose labour demand LDi that
satisfies F ′(LDi) = wi, with wi the gross wage. Labour demand will thus decrease in
gross wages, L′Di(w) < 0. Production is used for private as well as public consumption,
with the marginal rate of transformation between the publicly provided private and fully
private good equal to 1.
The representative household maximises Ui(ci, Li, Gi, G
F
i ) subject to its budget con-
straint ci = w¯iLi + pii, with w¯i = (1 − τi)wi the net wage. Labour supply Li(w¯i), is
implicitly defined by Uci(.)w¯i + ULi = 0. It increases with net wage, L
′
Si
(w¯i) > 0, and is
assumed to be perfectly mobile. As said before, households as a whole will never migrate.
We have thus modeled commuting through a common inter-state labour market, where
wages are endogenously determined as commuting flows equilibrate gross wages in all
states. Indirect utility Vi then becomes Vi(w¯i, pii, Gi, G
F
i ).
To derive the wage effects of a state tax increase, we start from the common labour
market clearing condition:
n∑
i
LSi(w¯i) =
n∑
i
LDi(w) (1)
Taking the total differential with respect to τi of this condition gives us (see appendix
A.1):
∂w
∂τi
=
wη
n(1− τ) (η − ε) > 0 (2)
With η > 0 the labour supply elasticity, ε < 0 labour demand elasticity andτ = τi+τ0.
As usual, tax incidence will be shifted onto labour supply and demand according to the
relevant elasticities. The net wage effect will then be (see appendix A.1):
∂w¯
∂τi
=
w (nε− (n− 1)η)
n (η − ε) < 0 (3)
Since federal taxation has a direct impact on labour supplied in all states, the wage
responses to a marginal tax increase at the federal level will be different. To see this, we
again take the total differential of the same common labour market condition (1), but
now with respect to a federal tax τ0 levied in all states (see appendix). This gives us:
∂w
∂τ0
=
wη
(1− τ) (η − ε) > 0 (4)
And for the net wage effect:
∂w¯
∂τ0
=
wε
(η − ε) < 0 (5)
We see that the gross wage effects of state taxation are smaller, whilst the net wage
effects are larger. This should not be surprising, since a state tax increase is expected to
9A subscript denotes the derivative of a function of several variables whereas a prime denotes the
derivative of a function of one variable.
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have a smaller impact on wages as a uniform, national tax increase. As the gross wage
starts to rise in the state raising its taxes, more and more workers from other states will
flock to this region, mitigating the gross wage increase. When n goes to infinity, the
gross wage effect will be fully countered by the commuting response, as can be seen in
expression (2), and thus be equal to zero. The marginal tax burden will then fall entirely
on the local workers and weigh in at −w, since ∂w¯i∂τi = (1− τi − τ0) ∂w∂τi − w .
What remains is the effect of taxation on profits, which is the same for state as well
as federal taxation:
∂pii
∂τi,0
=
∂ (Fi(LDi)− wLDi)
∂τi,0
= −LDi
∂w
∂τi,0
(6)
3 Second-best optimum in a 'unitary' country
We start with the benchmark case of a unitary country, where the states are given no
taxing or spending powers and the federal level makes all the calls. The federal government
thus sets a uniform tax rate τ to finance consolidated public provision. Since taxation in
this setting is uniformly federal, no tax externalities can arise. Gross wages, as well as
net wages respectively, are identical across states for the same reason.
The federal government will tailor regional provision (Gi and G
F
i ) in each state i to the
preferences of the representative household living there10. We thus assume regional pref-
erences are known by the federal government, so that the inefficiencies working through
federal policy uniformity are ruled out. In other words, the federal government need not
set the same level of public good provision in each state. Expenditure externalities will
also be excluded since inter-state spillovers of public provision itself are assumed away in
the model. All of these restrictions to keep the focus strictly on tax externalities and the
resulting inefficiencies.
To keep matters simple, we start out by assuming that states are identical in every
way. Also, profits are assumed to accrue entirely to the representative household living
in the state where the rents are realised. In section 5 of the paper these assumptions
will be relaxed. Since we do not deal with redistributional issues in this paper lastly, the
federal government simply maximises a Utilitarian welfare function subject to its budget
constraint:
MaxGi,GFi ,τ n
{
Vi(w¯, pii, Gi, G
F
i )
}
s.t. n
(
Gi +G
F
i
)
= τnLiw (7)
With the values of τ , GFi and Gi to be chosen by the government. The first order
conditions readily reduce to (see appendix B):
MRS =
∂Vi
∂GFi
λi
=
∂Vi
∂Gi
λi
=
1(
1− τηε(1−τ)ε−η
) = MCPFu for all i = 1, .., n (8)
With λi the marginal utility of income in region i. This expression, together with the
budget constraint (7), characterizes the second-best optimum denoted by (τ∗, G∗i , G
F∗
i ).
It simply states that at the unitary optimum the distortionary tax τ is set such that the
marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between both the publicly provided good and the
10With Gi being the public provision to be provided by the states in the shared tax case.
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private good must be equal to the Marginal Cost of Public Funds (MCPF). As is well
known, the MCPF is the efficiency cost of raising revenue with a distortionary tax.
4 Decentralised taxation
Before we move on to the case where both federal as well as regional governments levy
taxes on a shared labour income tax base, and by consequence where both horizontal
and vertical externalities occur, we focus on the other side of the spectrum: the fully
decentralised case. This will serve as a stepping-stone to the more complex shared tax
base case.
4.1 Fully decentralised case
When fiscal decision making is fully decentralised to the state level, each state i levies a
labour tax τi to finance the publicly provided goods Gi and G
F
i . As a result, horizon-
tal externalities may distort tax and spending decisions. We assume that all states take
decisions made by other states as given, and thus behave as Nash competitors. We keep
on assuming that states are identical in every way, and calculate the symmetric equilib-
rium. The government of state i then maximises the indirect utility of the representative
household living within its borders, subject to its budget constraint:
MaxGi,GFi ,τi Vi(w¯i, pii, Gi, G
F
i )
s.t. Gi +G
F
i = τiLiw (9)
The first order conditions of this optimisation problem give us (see appendix C):
∂Vi
∂GFi
λi
=
∂Vi
∂Gi
λi
=
1(
1− τiη(nε−(n−1)η)(1−τi)(nε−(n−1)η)−η
) = MCPFi (10)
This expression, together with the budget constraint (8), characterizes the Nash equi-
librium, denoted by (τ∗i , G
∗
i , G
F
i ). Also in the fully decentralised case public provision con-
tinues until the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between both the publicly provided
good and the private good is equal to the state Marginal Cost of Public Funds (MCPF).
However, this efficiency cost overlooks all effects of own taxation on other states. It will
therefore generally be biased. The cost of raising revenue as it is perceived by the state
government in other words, will weigh in more or less than the socially relevant cost de-
rived in section 3. To verify the sign of this bias, a logical move would be to compare the
unitary MCPF which was unaffected by externalities (MCPFu), to the regional MCPF
(MCPFi) derived here. This gives us the following (evaluated at the Nash equilibrium
τ∗i = τ):
MCPFi =
1(
1− τ∗i η(nε−(n−1)η)(1−τ∗i )(nε−(n−1)η)−η
) S 1(
1− τηε(1−τ)ε−η
) = MCPFu (11)
Looking at the denominators in (11), we find that when the LHS outweighs the RHS in
(12) the denominator of the regional MCPF will be smaller than its unitary counterpart,
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so that the state MCPF will be perceived as larger than the unitary MCPF.
τη (nε− (n− 1)η)
(1− τ) (nε− (n− 1)η)− η >
τηε
(1− τ)ε− η (12)
When (12) holds in other words, the state MCPF will be biased upwards because of
a horizontal positive externality. The positive effect of regional taxation on other states
is not included in the state welfare cost, so that state governments will perceive the cost
of distortionary taxation to be higher than it actually is. As a result, state taxation as
well as public provision are set at inefficiently low levels compared to the second-best
outcome derived in section 3. As shown by (12), this will always be the case in our
simplified setting here11. In section 4, where profit taxation and regional heterogeneity
will be introduced, we will see that negative horizontal externalities may also appear.
Lastly, if the state government were to internalise the positive externality in its welfare
cost calculations, the cost would weigh in precisely at its socially relevant level (to see
this formally, we refer to appendix C.2).
Now, as can be seen formally in (53), a positive externality stems from the positive
effect of a tax increase in region i on tax revenues and consumer welfare in other states.
Here, the effects on tax revenues in other states are twofold. Due to the gross wage
increase, which will be identical across states because of commuting, the tax base in
other states logically rises and so will collected tax revenues. Yet because of the higher
gross wage, overall labour demand decreases, leading to a fall in total labour supply. Now,
since taxes are left unaltered in other states, net wages will also be pulled up in these
states. Labour supply follows suit, which partially compensates for the decrease in state
i where the net wage falls because of the tax increase. Partially, since as we said total
labour supply will fall as well. In any case, this labour supply increase gives a second
boost to tax revenues raised in other states.
Both effects are strengthened by a third, and direct effect on non-resident welfare. A
higher net wage in other regions not only improves non-resident welfare through increased
public provision, but also because purchasing power comes out reinforced. Furthermore,
all three effects combined appear to dominate the negative direct effect on non-resident
welfare, which is the drop in collected profits due to the higher gross wage. Lastly, the
higher the amount of regions in the federation the stronger the positive externality and
subsequent welfare losses, a result reminiscent of Hoyt's (1991) capital tax model. This
can also easily be seen in (12), where a higher n nudges up the LHS compared to the
RHS.
Looking at this result from a more strategic point of view, it would seem that states
set taxes at inefficiently low levels not to attract more workers, but to boost labour supply
of their own residents and discourage labour supplied by non-residents. Indeed, if a state
would decrease its taxes the net wage of its own residents would increase, whilst the net
wage of non-residents would go down (because of the gross wage decrease). Of course,
since all states are symmetric and will follow the same strategy, we arrive at the familiar
sub-optimal welfare level where all taxes are set too low.
11Keeping in mind that ε < 0 and η > 0, the term (nε− (n− 1)η) on the LHS of expression (12) will
be larger in absolute value compared to its counterpart in the RHS which is simply ε. It then suffices to
take the derivative of the RHS with respect to ε, which is negative, and thus positive in absolute value,
to prove that the inequality always holds.
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4.2 Shared tax base case
We now move on to the case where both the federal and regional governments levy taxes on
labour, giving rise to horizontal and vertical tax externalities. The federal government will
again tailor regional provision (GFi ) in each region i to the preferences of the representative
household living there. On top of this, each region will raise additional regional taxes to
finance own public provision (Gi). We continue assuming that all governments behave as
Nash competitors12 and that states are identical in every way. We furthermore assume
that the federal government takes into account all the effects of its taxation policy on state
budgets, so that its MCPF will be the same as in the unitary case. We can therefore
jump straight to the regional government's problem.
The government of state i again optimises the following welfare function subject to
its budget constraint:
MaxGi,τi vi(w¯i, pii) + g
F
i (G
F
i ) + gi(Gi)
s.t. Gi = τiLSiwi (13)
The first order conditions of this optimisation problem give us (see appendix D):
∂Vi
∂Gi
λi
=
1(
1− τiη(nε−(n−1)η)−τ0η(1−τ)(nε−(n−1)η)−η
) = MCPFSharedi (14)
This expression, together with the budget constraint (13), characterizes the Nash
equilibrium, denoted by (τ∗i , G
∗
i ). Again, public provision will continue until the marginal
rate of substitution (MRS) between both the publicly provided good and the private good
is equal to the state Marginal Cost of Public Funds (MCPF). Moreover, not only does this
efficiency cost overlook all (positive) horizontal effects of own taxation on other states,
it will also fail to internalise the vertical effects. Increased state taxation will have an
impact on tax revenues raised by the federal government, an overlooked vertical effect
which will be twofold. The higher gross wage will increase federal revenue, whilst the
drop in total labour supplied will have a negative effect on the federal budget since the
tax base shrinks. To find out which effect will come out on top and thus to determine the
sign of the overall externality, we again compare the unitary MCPF (MCPFu) with the
MCPF obtained here. We evaluate at the Nash equilibrium τ∗i + τ
∗
0 = τ , where the share
of both state and federal tax rates in the total tax will depend on the relative strengths
of federal and state preferences for public provision. We then get:
MCPFSharedi =
1(
1− τ∗i η(nε−(n−1)η)−τ∗0 η(1−τ)(nε−(n−1)η)−η
) S 1(
1− τηε(1−τ)ε−η
) = MCPFu (15)
If the efficiency cost under the shared tax base case turns out to be smaller, the
overall externality will be negative and state overprovision ensues. In this case the upward
12In most models of fiscal interaction between regional and federal governments, the federal government
is modeled as a Stackelberg leader (See, Boadway (1996) Sato (2000) or Kotsogiannis and Martinez
(2007)). Whether federal governments deliberately manipulate states' fiscal decisions remains an, however
interestingly, empirical question to be answered. We follow Dahlby's (2008) position which questions the
fact that in a democracy, where voters have limited knowledge about the interactions between the various
levels of governments, Stackelberg leadership behaviour would emerge.
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pressure on the perceived state efficiency cost caused by the positive horizontal externality
is more than undone by the vertical effects. If, on the other hand, the regional MCPF
remains larger than the second-best efficiency cost, the positive effects (horizontal as well
as vertical) on non-resident welfare will have prevailed. Zooming in on (15), we extract
the following condition for such a scenario to occur :
τ∗i (nε− (n− 1)η)− τ∗0
(1− τ) (nε− (n− 1)η)− η >
τε
(1− τ)ε− η (16)
As (16) clearly shows, it becomes more likely for the regional MCPF to be biased
upwards as the state share τ∗i in the total tax rate τ increases in equilibrium. This
should not be too surprising, since such an increase would bring us closer to the fully
decentralised case where the only externalities are horizontal and positive, as shown in
section 4.1 above. It is therefore interesting to investigate the forces at hand which drive
down the state MCPF when the state tax share is smaller, which has us taking a closer
look at the vertical interaction. The effect of a marginally increased state tax rate τi on
the federal budget, which will be ignored by the state in question, can be written as (see
appendix D.2):
∂R0
∂τi
=
{
(n− 1)
(
τ0L
∂w
∂τi
+ τ0w(1− τj)∂Lj
∂w¯
∂w¯
∂τi
)}
+ τ0
(
L
∂w
∂τi
+ w
∂L
∂w¯
∂w¯
∂τi
)
(17)
We see that the vertical effect indeed follows from both the gross wage increase as
the labour supply response. Splitting up the vertical interaction into two parts, a first
part between large brackets in (17) concerns the other states and will be positive 13. The
remaining, second effect concerns state i itself, and could turn either way depending on
the sign of:
τ0
(
L
∂w
∂τi
+ w
∂L
∂w¯
∂w¯
∂τi
)
(18)
Now, zooming in on the first term between large brackets in (17), we can verify under
which conditions (18) will be negative. This first term of (17) in fact represents a fraction
of the total effect of increased taxation in state i on revenue collected in other states
(the federal as well as state level), which is (again evaluated at the shared tax case Nash
equilibrium): {
(n− 1)
(
(τ∗0 + τ
∗
i )L
∂w
∂τi
+ (τ∗0 + τ
∗
i )w(1− τj)
∂Lj
∂w¯
∂w
∂τi
)}
(19)
Indeed, and keeping in mind that τ0 + τi = τ , (19) is equal to the last term in the
denominator of (53) which was the effect of increased state taxation on the revenues of
all other states in the decentralised case. Overlooking this effect, the MCPF obtained
in section 4.1 (MCPFi) thus also overlooked the first effect of vertical interaction as
expressed by the first term of (17). If we then compare this MCPFi to the efficiency
cost derived here which ignores both the first and second effect of (17), we can determine
the sign of (18). If MCPFSharedi is smaller than MCPFi, (18) will be negative since
it has driven the perceived state MCPF down compared to the decentralised case. The
necessary and sufficient condition for this to occur is the following (see appendix D.2.2):
13Keeping in mind that
∂w¯j
∂τi
=
∂((1−τj)w)
∂τi
= (1− τj) ∂w∂τi > 0 (see also appendix D.2).
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(nε− (n− 1)η) < −1 (20)
A result which can also easily be obtained by plugging in the wage effects (2) and (3)
in (18). As labour demand becomes more elastic, (18) will become more negative, and
chances overall of having a negative externality will rise. This is a logical result, as the
positive effect on federal revenue due to the increasing gross wage will be mitigated the
more elastic is labour demand. Secondly, as (2) also shows, a higher number of states
in the federation would only strengthen this mitigating effect. A higher labour supply
elasticity lastly, will result in (18) to turn negative as well, and thus also puts a downwards
bias on the state efficiency cost. Again this is logical, since highly elastic labour supply
will result in a more pronounced drop in total labour supplied across the federation.
Turning our attention back to (17), we can easily see why such a negative externality
would gain in momentum as the federal tax rate accounts for a larger share of the total tax
rate τ . Assuming (18) is negative (which is readily the case under realistic assumptions),
we can see that a larger federal tax rate will bolster this negative effect. On the other
hand, the positive effect of the vertical interaction which was the first term between large
brackets in (17), will remain unchanged. This for the simple reason that as the federal
tax share increases, the regional share would go down. The positive revenue effects would
thus be exactly the same as before as can be seen in (19). We summarise these first
findings as follows:
Proposition 1. When workers can commute costlessly between identical
states of a federation, and when the labour income tax base is co-occupied
by the federal and state governments, state taxes will more likely be set ineffi-
ciently high when:
(a) Labour demand as well as supply are more elastic
(b) There are more states in the federation
(c) The federal tax rate accounts for a larger share in the total tax rate
As proposition 1 shows, determining the extent of inefficient public provision in our shared
tax setting is rather different than one would expect. It does not boil down to first
identifying the sign of the horizontal and vertical externality in isolation, to ascertain in
a second step which externality will dominate the other in a shared tax case as done by
Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002; 2004). In isolation here would then mean a case without
federal taxation as for the horizontal externality, and a case where tax bases are immobile
between states for the vertical externality. Indeed, one of the main findings of this paper
is that the overall externality may be negative even when both the horizontal as well as
vertical externality evaluated in isolation are positive.
We delve deeper into this issue by considering what would happen to the state MCPF
when we look at the vertical externality in isolation. By internalising all horizontal effects
of increased state taxation in state i, the perceived efficiency cost only overlooks vertical
effects of own taxation as it would without . We thus include the effects of own taxation
on consumer welfare in other states to the numerator of MCPFSharedi , and the effects
on revenue collected by other states to the denominator (effects included between large
brackets):
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MCPFi = −
(
LSi
∂w¯i
∂τi
+ ∂pii∂τi
)
+
{∑n
j 6=i
(
LSj
∂w¯j
∂τi
+
∂pij
∂τi
)}
(
LSiw + τiLSi
∂w
∂τi
+ τiw
∂LSi
∂w¯i
∂w¯i
∂τi
)
+
{∑n
j 6=i
(
τjLSj
∂w
∂τi
+ τjw
∂LSj
∂w¯j
∂w¯j
∂τi
)}
(21)
Now, this efficiency cost still overlooks the impact of own taxation on the federal
budget, yet it takes into account the horizontal effect of own taxation on other states.
Since we have proven in section 4.1 that ignoring this effect pushes the perceived state
MCPF upwards, we would expect the same here. If the vertical externality would already
be positive consequently, leaving out the positive horizontal effects may then be expected
to strengthen the upward bias on the state MCPF. In other words, we would expect (21)
to increase when the effects between large brackets are excluded. The idea that vertical
and horizontal externalities of the same sign (when considered in isolation) reinforce each
other when put together, would then be a valid one. Yet as we will show, this is far from
always the case in our setting. Rewriting (21) gives us 14:
MCPFi = −
(
LSi
∂w¯i
∂τi
− L ∂w
∂τi
)
−
{
(n− 1)L ∂w
∂τi
}
(
LSiw + τiLSi
∂w
∂τi
+ τiw
∂LSi
∂w¯i
∂w¯i
∂τi
)
+
{
(n− 1)
(
τiL
∂w
∂τi
+ τiw(1− τj) ∂Lj∂w¯ ∂w∂τi
)}
(22)
Looking at the addition between large brackets in the denominator of (22), which is
the positive effect of own taxation on the tax revenue raised in other states, we see that
this represents only a part of the total effect expressed by (19). Not too surprising, since
the effect on other states' revenues working through the impact of own taxation on federal
revenues is still excluded here. However, the full direct effect on non-resident utility is
taken into account in the numerator, which is negative because of the decreasing profits in
other states. Therefore, when the regional tax share in the total tax is low, the negative
profit effects may outweigh the positive budgetary effects, causing (22) to decrease if we
leave out both effects between large brackets 15.
The attentive reader may have noticed that this line of reasoning runs entirely parallel
to our approach set out earlier arriving at proposition 1. There we started by considering
the horizontal externality in isolation, and compared the efficiency cost under this decen-
tralised case to the cost derived when taxation is shared. The former is indeed none other
than the latter, if we internalise those vertical effects which do not concern other states.
To see this, we add the vertical effects that only concern state i to the denominator of
MCPFSharedi :
MCPFi = −
(
LSi
∂w¯i
∂τi
+ ∂pii
∂τi
)
(
LSiw + τiLSi
∂w
∂τi
+ τiw
∂LSi
∂w¯i
∂w¯i
∂τi
)
+
{
τ0
(
LSi
∂w
∂τi
+ w
∂LSi
∂w¯i
∂w¯i
∂τi
)} (23)
We thus arrive at the efficiency cost derived under section 4.1, which was biased
upwards. Now, even when the total vertical interaction (17) is positive, leaving out the
addition between large brackets will not necessarily have (23) increase. On the contrary,
14Taking into account that states are identical and thus also that
∂w¯j
∂τi
=
∂((1−τj)w)
∂τi
= (1− τj) ∂w∂τi , as
well as (6).
15Keeping in mind that the numerator of (22), otherwise negative, will turn positive because of the
minus sign in front of the fraction.
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(23) will decrease when (19) is negative, an effect strengthened by a larger share of
federal taxation as shown before. Again not too surprising, since the positive effect
on other states' revenues working through the federal budget is still omitted from the
denominator.
Both approaches thus represent two opposite sides of the same coin, which is why the
end result is the same. Since part of the effect of the vertical (horizontal) externality
evaluated in isolation will always be part of the horizontal (vertical) externality evaluated
in isolation, combining both in a shared tax case scenario may lead to unexpected results.
The extent of which depends on the share of federal taxation in the total tax, and thus
on the outcome of the Nash equilibrium. We summarise in proposition 2:
Proposition 2. When workers can commute costlessly between identical
states of a federation, and when the labour income tax base is co-occupied
by the federal and state governments, the overall externality may be negative
even when the vertical and horizontal externalities are positive when evaluated
in isolation. There is a critical equilibrium value of federal taxation above
which this will be the case.
Proof: see appendix D.3
5 Heterogeneous regions
We now let go of the assumption that regions are identical in every way. Preferences, as
well as technology across regions may differ in this setting. Also, all rents are assumed
to accrue to the public sector since they represent an efficient source of tax revenues
(θ(i) = 1). We again start with defining the second-best optimum, and will then limit
ourselves to a brief analysis of the fully decentralised case. Since the shared tax case is
not considered here, we need not distinguish between state and federal public provision.
5.1 Second-best optimum in a 'unitary' country
The federal government will again maximise a Utilitarian welfare function subject to its
budget constraint:
MaxG,τ
n∑
i
{Vi(w¯) + gi(Gi)} (24)
s.t.
n∑
i
Gi = τ
n∑
i
Liw +
n∑
i
θpii (25)
With the values of τ and Gi to be chosen by the government. The first order conditions
will readily reduce to (see appendix E.1 for intermediary steps):
∂Vi
∂Gi∑n
i (siλi)
=
(
1
1− τL(1−τ)
∑n
i ηiLi
)
for i = 1, .., n (26)
With λi the marginal utility of income in region i. This expression, together with the
budget constraint (25), characterizes the second-best optimum, denoted by (τ∗, G∗i ) for
all i = 1, .., n. It simply states that at the unitary optimum the distortionary tax τ is set
such that the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between the publicly provided good
in state i and a weighted average of private consumption must be equal to the Marginal
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Cost of Public Funds (MCPF). This again is the efficiency cost of raising revenue with a
distortionary tax, which will be identical across all states at the unitary optimum.
5.2 Fully decentralised case
We keep on assuming that all regions take tax and expenditure decisions of other regions
as given, and play a simultaneous game resulting in a Nash equilibrium. Since regional
taxation need not be symmetric in this setting, regional net wages may differ whilst the
common labour market will still clear at an identical gross wage. A regional govern-
ment again maximises the indirect utility of the representative household living within
its borders, subject to its budget constraint:
MaxGi,τi Vi(w¯i, Gi)
s.t. Gi = τiLiw + θpii (27)
The first order conditions of this optimisation problem give us (see appendix E.2):
∂Vi
∂Gi
λi
=
1
1− τiηi(1−τi) −
(
1− LDiLsi
) ηi Lsiw¯i((∑n
i εi
LDi
w
)
−∑nj 6=i((1−τj)ηj Lsjw¯j
))
 (28)
Again this efficiency cost will fail to internalise all horizontal effects of own taxation
on other states. But unlike our previous result, this horizontal externality can be of any
sign. To see this, we follow the familiar approach employed above to identify the sign
of the externality. Comparing the denominator of the state efficiency cost in (28) to its
counterpart under the second-best outcome, we get that the externality will be positive
when:
(
τ∗i ηi
(1− τi)
)
+
(
1− LDi
Lsi
) ηi Liw¯i((∑n
i εi
LDi
w
)
−∑nj 6=i ((1− τj)ηj Lsjw¯j ))
 > τ
L(1− τ)
n∑
i
ηiLi
(29)
Again evaluated at the Nash equilibrium, where we set τ = τ∗i . The main result we
wish to stress here is the effect of commuting, i.e. the regional out-or inflow of commuters
(
LDi
Lsi
). Since the third term between brackets on the LHS of expression (29) is negative,
this LHS will more likely outweigh the RHS when less people work in region i than is
demanded, i.e. LDi > LSi . In other words, an inflow of commuters makes it more likely
for the horizontal externality to be positive. This is a logical result, since the positive
effect on tax revenues in other regions due to higher gross wages will be stronger the
higher the level of labour supplied in these regions, and thus the more region i relies on
labour flowing in from other regions. But there is more to the story. We zoom in on
the total budgetary effect of marginally increased taxation in state i on other states to
clarify:
n∑
ji6=j
∂Rj
∂τi
=
n∑
ji6=j
(
τjLj
∂w
∂τi
+ τjw
∂Lj
∂w¯j
∂w¯j
∂τi
− LDj
∂w
∂τi
)
(30)
Since profits are taxed in our setting, there will also be a negative budgetary effect
due to the gross wage increase which is expressed by the third term on the RHS of (30).
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It then becomes clear that a higher labour supply in other regions combined with a low
labour demand, is what drives the positive budgetary effects. The more workers region j
has to tax at a higher gross wage, as expressed by the first terms on the RHS of (30), the
higher the chance for the positive effect on state j's tax revenue to outweigh the negative
effect working through the profit tax. A negative effect which will itself be lower when
less labour is demanded in state j. Hence, an outflow of workers out of all states to state
i, makes it more likely for the externality to turn positive. We summarise in proposition
3:
Proposition 3. When states in a federation differ in terms of preferences
and technology, a commuting inflow of workers makes it more likely for states
to set taxes inefficiently low.
6 Summary and concluding remarks
As one of the smallest federations in Europe, Belgium makes for an interesting case
study. Counting only three sub-central entities (states), each with diverging preferences
and productivity, it enjoys a very high degree of cross-state commuting. Zooming in on
these commuting flows brings out a blind spot in the fiscal federalism literature on tax
externalities, where models have workers supply labour only in their state of residence. For
a federation with Belgian features, where at least 10% of the workforce commutes between
regions, this assumption of non-integrated regional labour markets becomes difficult to
maintain.
We therefore presented a theoretical model based on a common labour market, where
wages are endogenously determined as commuting flows equilibrate wages across all states
of a federation. Policy changes in one state will consequently be felt throughout the entire
federal system, even when household migration does not occur. We thus model a situation
where horizontal externalities are re-introduced to the analysis through commuting effects.
To allow for positive as well as negative vertical externalities furthermore, the effects of
a (partial) decentralisation of an ad valorem tax on labour income were studied, a tax
which was residence based following the Belgian setting.
When taxation was fully decentralised first of all, state governments would set in-
efficiently low taxes not to attract more workers, but to boost labour supply of own
residents and hamper labour supplied by non-residents. In other words, when considered
in isolation, the horizontal externality was shown to be positive but different in nature
compared to the familiar capital tax competition models. When the labour tax base was
co-occupied by the federal and state governments secondly, either public under- or over-
provision would occur. Our model identified clear conditions for states to overprovide,
i.e. for the overall fiscal externality to be negative. An elastic labour supply as well as
demand, the number of states and the share of federal spending in total public provision,
were crucial elements here. Also, and quite the interesting find, such a negative fiscal
externality could arise even when the vertical as well as horizontal externalities were pos-
itive in isolation, and one would expect underprovision. Lastly, in a an attempt to have
the model capture the Belgian setting to the fullest, we allowed for regional heterogeneity.
When states differ in terms of preferences and technology, we showed how an inflow of
commuters will make it more likely for states to set taxes inefficiently low.
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Appendix
A Tax shifting formulas
A.1 Regional taxation
We obtain the tax shifting formula from the equilibrium in the labour market:
n∑
i
LSi(w¯i) =
n∑
i
LDi(w)
d
Taking the total differential with respect to τi of the labour market equilibrium con-
dition then yields:
n∑
j 6=i
(
∂
(
LSj (w¯j)
)
∂w¯j
∂w¯j
∂τi
)
+
∂LSi(wi)
∂w¯i
∂w¯i
∂τi
=
n∑
i
(
∂ (LDi(w))
∂w
)
∂w
∂τi
Rewriting net wages in terms of the gross wage and solving further gives:
n∑
j 6=i
(
L′Sj
∂ (w − τj − τ0)
∂τi
)
+ L′Si
∂ (w − τi − τ0)
∂τi
=
(
n∑
i
L′Di
)
∂w
∂τi
(31)
Now, since we know that:
∂ (w − τi − τ0)
∂τi
=
∂w
∂τi
− 1
We also know that:
∂ (w − τi − τ0) = ∂w − ∂τi (32)
And:
∂ (w − τj − τ0)
∂τi
=
∂w
∂τi
So that:
∂ (w − τj − τ0) = ∂w (33)
Plugging (32) and (33) into (31) then gives us:
n∑
j 6=i
(
L′Sj∂w
)
+ L′Si (∂w − ∂τi) =
(
n∑
i
L′Di
)
∂w
(
n∑
i
(
L′Si
)− n∑
i
L′Di
)
∂w = +L′Si∂τi
∂w
∂τi
=
L′Si(∑n
i
(
L′Si
)−∑ni L′Di) > 0 (34)
16
Rewriting (35) in terms of regional labour supply elasticity ηi = L
′
Si
w¯i
L′Si
and labour
demand elasticity εi = L
′
Di
w
L′Di
now yields:
∂w
∂τi
=
wηi
Lsi
w¯i(∑n
i
(
(1− τi − τ0)ηi Lsiw¯i
)
−
(∑n
i εi
LDi
w
)) (35)
We know that, in equilibrium,∂w¯i∂τi = (1− τi − τ0) ∂w∂τi − w, so plugging in (35) then
gives us:
∂w¯i
∂τi
=
(1− τi − τ0)wL′Si − w
(∑n
i
(
L′Si(1− τi − τ0)
)− (∑ni L′Di))(∑n
i
(
L′Si(1− τi − τ0)
)− (∑ni L′Di))
∂w¯i
∂τi
=
w
((∑n
i L
′
Di
)−∑nj 6=i (L′Sj (1− τj − τ0)))(∑n
i
(
L′Si(1− τi − τ0)
)− (∑ni L′Di)) < 0 (36)
For later purposes, we rewrite (37) in terms of regional labour supply and demand:
∂w¯i
∂τi
=
w
((∑n
i εi
LDi
w
)
−∑nj 6=i ((1− τj − τ0)ηj Lsjw¯j ))(∑n
i
(
(1− τi − τ0)ηi Lsiw¯i
)
−
(∑n
i εi
LDi
w
)) (37)
Under the assumption of homogeneous regions, (35) and (37) reduce to:
∂w
∂τi
=
wη
n(1− τ) (η − ε) (38)
∂w¯
∂τi
=
w (nε− (n− 1)η)
n (η − ε) (39)
A.2 Federal taxation
Taking the total differential with respect to τ0 yields:
n∑
i
(
∂LSi(w¯)
∂(w¯)
∂w¯
∂τ0
)
=
n∑
i
(
∂LDi(w)
∂w
∂w
∂τ0
)
Rewriting net wages in terms of the gross wage and solving further finally gives us:
n∑
i
(
L′Si
∂ ((1− τi − τ0)w))
∂τ0
)
=
(
n∑
i
L′Di
)
∂w
∂τ0
(40)
Now, since we know that:
∂ ((1− τi − τ0)w))
∂τ0
= (1− τi − τ0) ∂w
∂τ0
− w
We also know that:
∂ ((1− τi − τ0)w)) = (1− τi − τ0)∂w − w∂τ0 (41)
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Plugging (41) into (40) then gives us:
n∑
i
(
L′Si ((1− τi − τ0)∂w − w∂τ0)
)
=
(
n∑
i
L′Di
)
∂w
(
n∑
i
(
L′Si(1− τi − τ0)
)−( n∑
i
L′Di
))
∂w =
n∑
i
(
L′Siw∂τ0
)
∂w
∂τ0
=
w
∑n
i L
′
Si(∑n
i
(
L′Si(1− τi − τ0)
)− (∑ni L′Di)) (42)
For later purposes, we rewrite (42) in terms of regional labour supply and demand:
∂w
∂τ0
=
w
∑n
i ηi
Lsi
w¯i(
(1− τi − τ0)
∑n
i
(
ηi
Lsi
w¯i
)
−∑ni (εi LDiw )) > 0 (43)
Moving on to the effect on net wages, we know that, in equilibrium,∂w¯∂τ = (1− τ) ∂w∂τ −
w. Plugging in (43) then gives us:
∂w¯
∂τ0
=
(1− τi − τ0)w
∑n
i L
′
Si
− w ((1− τi − τ0)∑ni L′Si −∑ni L′Di)(
(1− τi − τ0)
∑n
i L
′
Si
−∑ni L′Di)
∂w¯
∂τ
=
w
∑n
i L
′
Di(
(1− τi − τ0)
∑n
i L
′
Si
−∑ni L′Di) < 0 (44)
For later purposes, we rewrite (45) in terms of regional labour supply and demand:
∂w¯
∂τ0
=
w
∑n
i εi
LDi
w(
(1− τi − τ0)
∑n
i
(
ηi
Lsi
w¯i
)
−∑ni (εi LDiw )) (45)
Under the assumption of homogeneous regions, (43) and (45) reduce to the well known
expressions:
∂w
∂τ0
=
wη
(1− τ) (η − ε) (46)
∂w¯
∂τ0
=
wε
(η − ε) (47)
B Calculations second-best optimum in a 'unitary' coun-
try
The second best optimization problem is expressed by the Lagrangian:
L = n{Vi(w¯, pii, Gi, GFi )}− γ {n (Gi +GFi )− τnLiw}
Leading to the following first order conditions:
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∂L
∂τ
= n
{
∂Vi
w¯
∂w¯
∂τ
+
∂Vi
pii
∂pii
∂τ
}
+ γ
(
∂(τnLiw)
∂τ
)
= 0
∂L
∂Gi
=
∂Vi
∂Gi
− γ = 0 for i = 1, .., n
∂L
∂GFi
=
∂Vi
∂GFi
− γ = 0 for i = 1, .., n
Solving both conditions yields:
n
{
∂Vi
w¯
∂w¯
∂τ
+
∂Vi
pii
∂pii
∂τ
}
+ γ
(
nLiw + τnLi
∂w
∂τ
+ τnw
∂Li
∂w¯
∂w¯
∂τ
)
= 0 (τ)
∂Vi
∂Gi
− γ = 0 for i = 1, .., n (Gi)
∂Vi
∂GFi
− γ = 0 for i = 1, .., n (GFi )
With nLiw + τnLi
∂w
∂τ + τnw
∂Li
∂w¯
∂w¯
∂τ equal to
∂R
∂τ , being the marginal effect on federal
revenue by raising the labour tax. Substituting for γ then yields:
∂Vi
∂GFi
=
∂Vi
∂Gi
= −
n
{
∂Vi
w¯
∂w¯
∂τ +
∂Vi
pii
∂pii
∂τ
}
∂R
∂τ
for i = 1, .., n (48)
Public provision in each region will thus continue until its marginal benefits equal
its marginal cost, and this in terms of welfare cost as well as actual provision cost (see
also Dahlby, 2008). The RHS of the equation thus expresses the marginal welfare cost in
utility terms of raising an additional euro of revenue to finance public provision in region
i, multiplied by the marginal cost of actual provision (1 in our case). This expression can
be reformulated to arrive at the conventional MCPF expression using Roy's identity:
∂Vi
∂Gi
λi
= −
(
Li
∂w¯
∂τ +
∂pii
∂τi
)
Liw + τLi
∂w
∂τ + τw
∂Li
∂w¯
∂w¯
∂τ
for i = 1, .., n (49)
Expression (49) simply states that at the unitary optimum the ad valorem tax τ is set
such that the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between both the public and the private
good must be equal to the MCPF. The conventional MCPF formula is thus extracted,
now in monetary terms as is usual:
MCPFC = −
(
Li
∂w¯
∂τ +
∂pii
∂τi
)
Liw + τLi
∂w
∂τ + τw
∂Li
∂w¯
∂w¯
∂τ
With subscript C standing for Centralised case. Rewriting the third term of the RHS
denominator as:
τw
∂Li
∂w¯
∂w¯
∂τ
= τw
∂Li
∂w¯
w¯
Li
Li
w¯
∂w¯
∂τ
= τwηi
Li
w(1− τi)
∂w¯
∂τ
=
τLiηi
(1− τi)
∂w¯
∂τ
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And plugging in the profit effect (6), we get:
MCPFC = −
(
LS
∂w¯
∂τ − LD ∂w∂τ
)(
LSw + τLS
∂w
∂τ + τw
∂LS
∂w¯
∂w¯
∂τ
)
Plugging in the wage effects (4) and (5), with wages and labour supply/demand drop-
ping out (homogeneous regions), then gives us
MCPFC = −
ε
(η−ε) − η(1−τ)(η−ε)(
1 + τ η(1−τ)(η−ε) +
τη
(1−τ)
ε
(η−ε)
) (50)
MCPFC = −
(1−τ)ε−η
(1−τ)(η−ε)(
1 + τ η(1−τ)(η−ε) +
τη
(1−τ)
ε
(η−ε)
)
MCPFC = − 1(
(1−τ)(η−ε)
(1−τ)ε−η + τ
η
(1−τ)ε−η +
τηε
(1−τ)ε−η
)
MCPFC =
1(
1 + τη(1−τ)ε−η − τ η(1−τ)ε−η − τηε(1−τ)ε−η
)
MCPFC =
1(
1− τηε(1−τ)ε−η
)
So that:
∂Vi
∂GFi
λi
=
∂Vi
∂Gi
λi
=
1(
1− τηε(1−τ)ε−η
) (51)
C Calculations fully decentralised case
C.1 Optimisation problem
The decentralised optimization problem is expressed by the Lagrangian:
L =Vi(w¯, pii, Gi, GFi )− γ
{(
Gi +G
F
i
)− τLiw}
Giving us the following FOC's:
∂L
∂τi
=
∂Vi
w¯i
∂w¯i
∂τi
+
∂Vi
pii
∂pii
∂τi
+ µ
(
LSiw + τiLSi
∂w
∂τi
+ τiw
∂LSi
∂w¯i
∂w¯i
∂τi
)
= 0
∂L
∂Gi
=
∂Vi
∂Gi
− γ = 0
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∂L
∂GFi
=
∂Vi
∂GFi
− γ = 0
Therefore:
∂Vi
∂GFi
=
∂Vi
∂Gi
= −
∂Vi
w¯i
∂w¯i
∂τi
+ ∂Vipii
∂pii
∂τi(
LSiw + τiLSi
∂w
∂τi
+ τiw
∂LSi
∂w¯i
∂w¯i
∂τi
)
Using Roy's identity, with λi marginal utility of income, and since
∂Vi
pii
= ∂Vi∂ci
∂ci
pii
=
λi × 1, we get:
MRSi =
∂Vi
∂Gi
λi
= − LSi
∂w¯i
∂τi
+ ∂pii∂τi(
LSiw + τiLSi
∂w
∂τi
+ τiw
∂LSi
∂w¯i
∂w¯i
∂τi
)
Since we are dealing with homogeneous regions, and after plugging in the profit effect
(6), we can write the regional welfare cost here as:
MCPFi = −
(
LS
∂w¯
∂τ − LD ∂w∂τ
)(
LSw + τLS
∂w
∂τ + τw
∂LS
∂w¯
∂w¯
∂τ
)
Rewriting as before, and plugging in the wage effects (2) and (3), with wages and
labour supply/demand dropping out:
MCPFi = −
(
(nε−(n−1)η)
n(η−ε) − ηn(1−τ)(η−ε)
)
(
1 + τ ηn(1−τ)(η−ε) +
τη
(1−τ)
(nε−(n−1)η)
n(η−ε)
)
Rewriting yields:
MCPFi = −
(1−τ)(nε−(n−1)η)−η
n(1−τ)(η−ε)(
1 + τ ηn(1−τ)(η−ε) +
τη
(1−τ)
(nε−(n−1)η)
n(η−ε)
)
MCPFi =
1(
n(1−τ)(ε−η)
(1−τ)(nε−(n−1)η)−η − η(1−τ)(nε−(n−1)η)−η + η(1−τ)(nε−(n−1)η)−η − τ η((1−τ)(nε−(n−1)η)−η) − τη(nε−(n−1)η)((1−τ)(nε−(n−1)η)−η)
)
MCPFi =
1(
1 + −(1−τ)η+η−τη−τη(nε−(n−1)η)(1−τ)(nε−(n−1)η)−η
)
MCPFi =
1(
1− τη(nε−(n−1)η)(1−τ)(nε−(n−1)η)−η
)
So that:
∂Vi
∂GFi
λi
=
∂Vi
∂Gi
λi
=
1(
1− τη(nε−(n−1)η)(1−τ)(nε−(n−1)η)−η
) (52)
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C.2 Internalising the horizontal externalities
Expression (54) gives us the MCPF of region i when all externalities are internalised.
The denominator thus has the effect of a tax increase on other regions' tax revenues
incorporated, whilst the numerator integrates the effect on the welfare of non-residents:
MCPFIi = −
LSi ∂w¯i∂τi + ∂pii∂τi +∑nj 6=i
(
LSj
∂w¯j
∂τi
+ ∂pii∂τi
)
∂Ri
∂τi
+
∑n
j 6=i
∂Rj
∂τi
 (53)
Or, rewriting:
MCPFIi = −
 LSi ∂w¯i∂τi + ∂pii∂τi +∑nj 6=i
(
LSj
∂w¯j
∂τi
+ ∂pii∂τi
)
LSiw + τiLSi
∂w
∂τi
+ τiw
∂LSi
∂w¯i
∂w¯i
∂τi
+
∑n
j 6=i
(
τjLSj
∂w
∂τi
+ τjw
∂LSj
∂w¯j
∂w¯j
∂τi
)

Plugging in the profit effect (6) gives us:
MCPFIi = −
 LSi ∂w¯i∂τi − LDi ∂w∂τi +∑nj 6=i
(
LSj
∂w¯j
∂τi
− LDj ∂w∂τi
)
LSiw + τiLSi
∂w
∂τi
+ τiw
∂LSi
∂w¯i
∂w¯i
∂τi
+
∑n
j 6=i
(
τjLSj
∂w
∂τi
+ τjw
∂LSj
∂w¯j
∂w¯j
∂τi
)

Since
∂w¯j
∂τi
=
∂((1−τj)w)
∂τi
= (1− τj) ∂w∂τi , and regions are homogeneous, this becomes:
MCPFIi = −
 L ∂w¯∂τi − L ∂w∂τi + (n− 1)L
(
(1− τ) ∂w∂τi − ∂w∂τi
)
Lw + τL ∂w∂τi + τw
∂L
∂w¯
∂w¯i
∂τ + (n− 1)
(
τL ∂w∂τi + τw
∂L
∂w¯ (1− τ)∂w∂τ
)
 (54)
Or, since τw ∂L∂w¯ = τw
∂L
∂w¯
w¯
L
L
w¯ = τwη
L
w(1−τ) =
τLη
(1−τ) :
MCPFIi = −
 L ∂w¯∂τi − L ∂w∂τi + (n− 1)L
(
(1− τ) ∂w∂τi − ∂w∂τi
)
Lw + τL ∂w∂τi +
τLη
(1−τ)
∂w¯i
∂τ + (n− 1)
(
τL ∂w∂τi +
τLη
(1−τ) (1− τ)∂w∂τ
)

Plugging in the regional wage effects (2) and (3), and with labour supply and demand
canceling out:
MCPFIi = −
 w(nε−(n−1)η)n(η−ε) − wηn(1−τ)(η−ε) + (n− 1)
(
(1− τ) wη
n(1−τ)(η−ε) − wηn(1−τ)(η−ε)
)
w + τ wη
n(1−τ)(η−ε) +
τη
(1−τ)
w(nε−(n−1)η)
n(η−ε) + (n− 1)
(
τ wη
n(1−τ)(η−ε) +
τη
(1−τ) (1− τ) wηn(1−τ)(η−ε)
)

Wages drop out as well:
MCPFIi = −
 (nε−(n−1)η)n(η−ε) − ηn(1−τ)(η−ε) + (n− 1)
(
η
n(η−ε) − ηn(1−τ)(η−ε)
)
1 + τ η
n(1−τ)(η−ε) +
τη
(1−τ)
(nε−(n−1)η)
n(η−ε) + (n− 1)
(
τ η
n(1−τ)(η−ε) +
τη
(1−τ)
η
n(η−ε)
)

So that we get:
MCPFIi = −
(
n εn(η−ε) − n ηn(1−τ)(η−ε)
1 + nτ ηn(1−τ)(η−ε) +
τη
(1−τ)
nε
n(η−ε)
)
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Or:
MCPFIi = −
(
ε
(η−ε) − η(1−τ)(η−ε)
1 + τ η(1−τ)(η−ε) +
τη
(1−τ)
ε
(η−ε)
)
Which is exactly equal to the welfare cost (50) derived under the second-best unitary
case:
MCPFC = −
ε
(η−ε) − η(1−τ)(η−ε)(
1 + τ η(1−τ)(η−ε) +
τη
(1−τ)
ε
(η−ε)
) (55)
D Calculations shared tax base case
D.1 Optimisation problem
The optimisation problem yields the same marginal rate of substitution as before :
MRSi =
∂Vi
∂Gi
λi
= − LSi
∂w¯i
∂τi
+ ∂pii∂τi(
LSiw + τiLSi
∂w
∂τi
+ τiw
∂LSi
∂w¯i
∂w¯i
∂τi
)
Plugging in the wage effects (2), (3) and profit effect (6), with wages and labour supply
and demand dropping out as before:
MCPFi = −
(
(nε−(n−1)η)
n(η−ε) − ηn(1−τ)(η−ε)
)
(
1 + τi
η
n(1−τ)(η−ε) +
τiη
(1−τ)
(nε−(n−1)η)
n(η−ε)
)
With τ = τi + τ0
Rewriting yields:
MCPFi = −
(1−τ)(nε−(n−1)η)−η
n(1−τ)(η−ε)(
1 + τi
η
n(1−τ)(η−ε) +
τiη
(1−τ)
(nε−(n−1)η)
n(η−ε)
)
MCPFi =
1(
n(1−τ)(ε−η)
(1−τ)(nε−(n−1)η)−η − η(1−τ)(nε−(n−1)η)−η + η(1−τ)(nε−(n−1)η)−η − τi η((1−τ)(nε−(n−1)η)−η) −
τiη(nε−(n−1)η)
((1−τ)(nε−(n−1)η)−η)
)
MCPFi =
1(
1 + −(1−τi−τ0)η+η−τiη−τiη(nε−(n−1)η)(1−τ)(nε−(n−1)η)−η
)
MCPFi =
1(
1 + τ0η−τiη(nε−(n−1)η)(1−τ)(nε−(n−1)η)−η
)
MCPFi =
1(
1− τiη(nε−(n−1)η)−τ0η(1−τ)(nε−(n−1)η)−η
)
So that:
∂Vi
∂Gi
λi
=
1(
1− τiη(nε−(n−1)η)−τ0η(1−τ)(nε−(n−1)η)−η
) (56)
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D.2 Calculations vertical interaction
D.2.1 Federal revenue effect
The effect of a marginally increased regional tax rate on the federal budget can in general
be written as:
∂R0
∂τi
=
∂ (τ0
∑n
i Liw)
∂τi
(57)
∂R0
∂τi
= τ0
n∑
i
(
Li
∂w
∂τi
)
+ τ0
n∑
j 6=i
(
w
∂Lj
∂w¯j
∂w¯j
∂τi
)
+ τ0w
∂Li
∂w¯i
∂w¯i
∂τi
(58)
Plugging in
∂w¯j
∂τi
=
∂((1−τj)w)
∂τi
= (1− τj) ∂w∂τi then yields:
∂R0
∂τi
= τ0
n∑
i
(
Li
∂w
∂τi
)
+ τ0w
n∑
j 6=i
(
(1− τj)∂Lj
∂w¯j
∂w
∂τi
)
+ τ0w
∂Li
∂w¯i
∂w¯i
∂τi
(59)
Or:
∂R0
∂τi
=
τ0
n∑
j 6=i
(
Lj
∂w
∂τi
)
+ τ0w
n∑
j 6=i
(
(1− τj)∂Lj
∂w¯j
∂w
∂τi
)+τ0Li ∂w∂τi +τ0w∂Li∂w¯i ∂w¯i∂τi (60)
Which, for homogeneous regions becomes:
∂R0
∂τi
=
{
(n− 1)
(
τ0L
∂w
∂τi
+ τ0w(1− τj)∂Lj
∂w¯
∂w
∂τi
)}
+ τ0L
∂w
∂τi
+ τ0w
∂L
∂w¯
∂w¯
∂τi
(61)
D.2.2 Sign second effect vertical interaction
Comparing the MCPF obtained in section 4.1 (MCPFi) with the efficiency cost derived
under the shared tax base case in section 4.2 (MCPFSharedi ), yields:
MCPFSharedi =
1(
1− τ∗i η(nε−(n−1)η)−τ∗0 η(1−τ)(nε−(n−1)η)−η
) S 1(
1− τη(nε−(n−1)η)(1−τ)(nε−(n−1)η)−η
) = MCPFi
(62)
Again evaluated at the Nash equilibrium τ∗i + τ
∗
0 = τ of the shared tax base case.
Now, we know that MCPFSharedi < MCPFi when:
τ∗i η (nε− (n− 1)η)− τ∗0 η
(1− τ) (nε− (n− 1)η)− η <
τη (nε− (n− 1)η)
(1− τ) (nε− (n− 1)η)− η (63)
Which boils down to:
τ∗i (nε− (n− 1)η)− τ∗0 > τ (nε− (n− 1)η) (64)
Which will hold if and only if:
(nε− (n− 1)η) < −1 (65)
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D.3 Proof proposition 2
Let us consider the isolated case where only vertical externalities can occur. The region
would then solve the exact same optimisation problem as in section 4.2, but then facing
the same wage effects (5) and (6) as the federal government would. One readily verifies
that this set-up would lead to the following equilibrium condition:
∂Vi
∂Gi
λi
=
1(
1− τiηε−τ0η(1−τ)ε−η
) = MCPFnohorizontali (66)
Now, we know that this efficiency cost will be biased upwards when:
MCPFnohorizontali =
1(
1− τ∗i ηε−τ∗0 η(1−τ)ε−η
) > 1(
1− τηε(1−τ)ε−η
) = MCPFC
Again evaluated at the Nash equilibrium τ∗i + τ
∗
0 = τ . This comes down to the
following:
τ∗i ηε− τ∗0 η
(1− τ)ε− η >
τηε
(1− τ)ε− η
Or:
τ∗i ε− τ∗0 < τε
Which gives us the necessary and sufficient condition for the vertical externality to be
positive:
MCPFnohorizontali > MCPFC ⇐⇒ ε > −1 (67)
A result which is also found by Dahlby (2003). Now, to prove a Nash equilibrium
(τ∗i , τ
∗
0 ) exists at which the MCPF under the shared tax base case (where both verti-
cal and horizontal interaction is combined) is lower than the second-best efficiency cost
(MCPFC), we have as before the following condition:
MCPFSharedi =
1(
1− τ∗i η(nε−(n−1)η)−τ∗0 η(1−τ)(nε−(n−1)η)−η
) < 1(
1− τηε(1−τ)ε−η
) = MCPFC
Or, rewritten:
τi (nε− (n− 1)η)− τ0
(1− τ)ε− η + τη(1− 1n )
<
nτε
(1− τ)ε− η (68)
Evaluating this condition for ε > −1, it is straightforward to see that a critical value
of τ∗0 will exist so that (68) will begin to hold.
We have thus shown that above this critical value:
MCPFSharedi < MCPFC < MCPF
nohorizontal
i (69)
Which, together with the fact that the horizontal externality when evaluated in iso-
lation will always be positive (see section 4.1), proves the proposition.
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E Heterogeneous regions
E.1 Optimisation problem second-best optimum
The second best optimization problem is expressed by the Lagrangian:
L = S − γ(
n∑
i
Gi − τ
n∑
i
Liw −
n∑
i
pii) (70)
With
∑n
i {Vi(w¯, Gi} = S. Leading to the following first order conditions:
∂L
∂τ
=
∂S
∂τ
+ γ
(
∂(τ
∑n
i Liw +
∑n
i pii)
∂τ
)
= 0 (71)
∂L
∂Gi
=
∂S
∂Gi
− γ = 0 for i = 1, .., n (72)
Solving both conditions yields:
n∑
i
∂Vi
∂w¯
∂w¯
∂τ
+ γ
(
n∑
i
Liw + τ
n∑
i
Li
∂w
∂τ
+ τ
n∑
i
w
∂Li
∂w¯
∂w¯
∂τ
+
∑ ∂pii
∂τ
)
= 0 (τ) (73)
∂Vi
∂Gi
− γ = 0 for i = 1, .., n (Gi) (74)
With
∑n
i Liw+τ
∑n
i Li
∂w
∂τ +τ
∑n
i w
∂Li
∂w¯
∂w¯
∂τ +
∑n
i
∂pii
∂τ equal to
∂R
∂τ , being the marginal
effect on federal revenue by raising the labour tax. Substituting for γ then yields:
∂Vi
∂Gi
= −
∑n
i
∂Vi
∂w¯
∂w¯
∂τ
∂R
∂τ
for i = 1, .., n (75)
Public provision in each region will again continue until its marginal benefits equal its
marginal cost, and this in terms of welfare cost as well as actual provision cost (see also
Dahlby, 2008). This expression can be reformulated to arrive at the conventional MCPF
expression using Roy's identity:
∂Vi
∂Gi
= −
∑n
i
(
Liλi
∂w¯
∂τ
)
∂R
∂τ
for i = 1, .., n (76)
Which we can rewrite as:
∂Vi
∂Gi∑n
i (siλi)
= −L
∂w¯
∂τ
∂R
∂τ
for i = 1, .., n (77)
With L =
∑n
i Li, λi the marginal utility of income of a household residing in region
i, and si this household's share (
Li
L ) in total labour supplied in the federation as a whole.
The conventional MCPF formula is thus once again extracted:
MCPFC = −
L∂w¯∂τ∑n
i Liw + τ
∑n
i Li
∂w
∂τ + τ
∑n
i w
∂Li
∂w¯
∂w¯
∂τ +
∑n
i
∂pii
∂τ
(78)
With the third term of the denominator to be rewritten as:
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τn∑
i
w
∂Li
∂w¯
∂w¯
∂τ
= τ
n∑
i
w
∂Li
∂w¯
w¯
Li
Li
w¯
∂w¯
∂τ
=
wτ
w¯
∂w¯
∂τ
n∑
i
ηiLi =
τ
(1− τ)
∂w¯
∂τ
n∑
i
ηiLi (79)
Plugging in (43), (45) and (6), we get:
MCPFC =
−

Lw
∑n
i εi
LDi
w(
(1−τ)∑n
i
(
ηi
Lsi
w¯i
)
−∑n
i
(
εi
LDi
w
))
∑n
i
Liw +
τ
∑n
i
Liw
∑n
i
ηi
Lsi
w¯i(
(1−τ)∑n
i
(
ηi
Lsi
w¯i
)
−∑n
i
(
εi
LDi
w
)) + τ(1−τ)Lw
∑n
i
εi
LDi
w
∑n
i
ηiLi(
(1−τ)∑n
i
(
ηi
Lsi
w¯i
)
−∑n
i
(
εi
LDi
w
)) − nLDiw
∑n
i
ηi
Lsi
w¯i(
(1−τ)∑n
i
(
ηi
Lsi
w¯i
)
−∑n
i
(
εi
LDi
w
))

Factoring out Lw and solving further gives us:
MCPFC = −

∑n
i εi
LDi
w(
(1−τ)∑n
i
(
ηi
Lsi
w¯i
)
−∑n
i
(
εi
LDi
w
))
1 +
τ
∑n
i
ηi
Lsi
w¯i(
(1−τ)∑n
i
(
ηi
Lsi
w¯i
)
−∑n
i
(
εi
LDi
w
)) + τ(1−τ)
∑n
i
εi
LDi
w
∑n
i
ηiLi(
(1−τ)∑n
i
(
ηi
Lsi
w¯i
)
−∑n
i
(
εi
LDi
w
)) −
∑n
i
ηi
Lsi
w¯i(
(1−τ)∑n
i
(
ηi
Lsi
w¯i
)
−∑n
i
(
εi
LDi
w
))

(80)
MCPFC = −

1(
(1−τ)∑n
i
(
ηi
Lsi
w¯i
)
−∑n
i
(
εi
LDi
w
))
∑n
i
εi
LDi
w
+ τ
∑n
i
ηi
Lsi
w¯∑n
i
εi
LDi
w
+ τ
L(1−τ)
∑n
i ηiLi −
∑n
i
ηi
Lsi
w¯∑n
i
εi
LDi
w

(81)
MCPFC =
(
1
1− τL(1−τ)
∑n
i ηiLi
)
(82)
So that:
∂Vi
∂Gi∑n
i (siλi)
=
(
1
1− τL(1−τ)
∑n
i ηiLi
)
for i = 1, .., n (83)
E.2 Optimisation problem fully decentralised case
It is straightforward to derive the following condition describing the optimum of the
problem:
∂gi
∂Gi
λi
= − Li
∂w¯i
∂τi
Liw + τiLi
∂w
∂τi
+ τiw
∂Li
∂w¯i
∂w¯i
∂τi
+ ∂pii∂τi
(84)
Plugging in (35), (37) and rewriting as before, we get:
MCPFi = −
Li w
((∑n
i εi
LDi
w
)
−∑nj 6=i
(
(1−τj)ηj
Lsj
w¯j
))
(∑n
i
(
(1−τi)ηi
Lsi
w¯i
)
−
(∑n
i
εi
LDi
w
))

Liwi + τiLi
 wηi Lsiw¯i(∑n
i
(
(1−τi)ηi
Lsi
w¯i
)
−
(∑n
i
εi
LDi
w
))
+ τiLiηi(1−τi) w
((∑n
i
εi
LDi
w
)
−∑n
j 6=i
(
(1−τj)ηj
Lsj
w¯j
))
(∑n
i
(
(1−τi)ηi
Lsi
w¯i
)
−
(∑n
i
εi
LDi
w
))
(85)
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−LDi
 wηi
Lsi
w¯i(∑n
i
(
(1− τi)ηi Lsiw¯i
)
−
(∑n
i εi
LDi
w
))

Factoring out Liw and solving further gives us:
MCPFi = −

((∑n
i εi
LDi
w
)
−∑nj 6=i
(
(1−τj)ηj
Lsj
w¯j
))
(∑n
i
(
(1−τi)ηi
Lsi
w¯i
)
−
(∑n
i
εi
LDi
w
))

1 + τi
 ηi Lsiw¯i(∑n
i
(
(1−τi)ηi
Lsi
w¯i
)
−
(∑n
i
εi
LDi
w
))
+ τiηi(1−τi)
((∑n
i
εi
LDi
w
)
−∑n
j 6=i
(
(1−τj)ηj
Lsj
w¯j
))
(∑n
i
(
(1−τi)ηi
Lsi
w¯i
)
−
(∑n
i
εi
LDi
w
))
(86)
−LDi
Lsi
 ηi
Lsi
w¯i(∑n
i
(
(1− τi)ηi Lsiw¯i
)
−
(∑n
i εi
LDi
w
))

MCPFi = −
1(∑n
i
(
(1−τi)ηi
Lsi
w¯i
)
−
(∑n
i
εi
LDi
w
))
((∑n
i
εi
LDi
w
)
−∑n
j 6=i
(
(1−τj)ηj
Lsj
w¯j
)) + τiηi
Lsi
w¯i((∑n
i
εi
LDi
w
)
−∑n
j 6=i
(
(1−τj)ηj
Lsj
w¯j
)) + τiηi
(1−τi)
−
LD
Lsi
ηi
Lsi
w¯i((∑n
i
εi
LDi
w
)
−∑n
j 6=i
(
(1−τj)ηj
Lsj
w¯j
))
(87)
MCPFi = −
1(∑n
j 6=i
(
(1−τj)ηj
Lsj
w¯j
)
+ηi
Lsi
w¯i
−
(∑n
i
ε
LD
w
))
((∑n
i
εi
LDi
w
)
−∑n
j 6=i
(
(1−τj)ηj
Lsj
w¯j
)) + τiηi
(1−τi)
−
LD
Lsi
ηi
Lsi
w¯i((∑n
i
εi
LDi
w
)
−∑n
j 6=i
(
(1−τj)ηj
Lsj
w¯j
))
(88)
MCPFi =
1
1− τiηi(1−τi) −
(
1− LDiLsi
) ηi Lsiw¯i((∑n
i εi
LDi
w
)
−∑nj 6=i((1−τj)ηj Lsjw¯j
))
 (89)
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